Silencing the Bomb Page 31

  Myers, Henry R., 44

  Nagasaki, 9

  National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. See U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine

  National Technical Means (NTM), 33, 133, 164, 202, 219, 224

  Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 131–32

  Nehru, Jawaharlal, 12

  Nelson, Robert, 54

  Nettles, Meredith, 174–75, 183–84, 187, 194

  Nevada Test Site, 23–24, 31, 59, 224; and aftershocks of Benham test (1968), 80–82; calibration of test site, 121; “chemical kiloton” test (1993), 178; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 108–9; earthquakes at, 187; JVE (Joint Verification Experiment) explosion (1988), 123, 126; monitoring of, 187; peaceful nuclear explosions at, 84; and plate tectonics, 69; and P wave propagation, 59–60; rock types at, 23, 52, 56–58, 93, 97; seismic monitoring by U.S. and Soviet scientists, 132; subcritical experiments, 224; tests in very small cavities, 50–51; and TTBT, 92; unidentified seismic events/nuclear explosions, 193(figure)

  Niger, 191

  Niger seismic array, 179

  Nitze, Paul, 198, 233

  Nixon, Richard, 5, 39, 78, 126

  noble gases, detection of, 163–64, 170, 177, 206, 220–21, 229

  Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 79–80, 160; and CTBT, 20; extension in 1995, 80; provisions of, 79–80; signers and nonsigning countries, 79, 87, 179, 186, 187; withdrawal of North Korea, 20, 79, 175

  Nordyke, Milo, 53, 110, 111

  NORSAR seismic array (Norway), 88, 97, 122

  North, Robert, 110

  North Korea, 37; and CTBT, 6, 162, 175; current capabilities for monitoring, 230; and danger of transfer of nuclear technology to other actors, 247; detection of nuclear tests in, 163, 164, 169, 174–78, 177(figure), 220, 227; earthquakes in, 174; and evasive testing, 54; lack of salt deposits, 50; and missile defense, 247; and NPT, 79; nuclear tests, 14, 163, 164, 170, 175, 177, 178, 194, 220, 227; number of nuclear weapons, 15; Punggye-ri test site, 175; unidentified seismic events/nuclear explosions, 192(figure), 193(figure), 194; withdrawal from NPT, 20, 79, 175

  Novaya Zemlya test site, 30, 92; and anomalous events/earthquake activity, 143, 145–51, 146(figure), 147(figure), 172, 193(figure), 227; current capabilities for monitoring, 171, 221, 227, 230; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 109; and magnitude bias, 236–37; published yields of nuclear tests, 235; and radionuclide monitoring, 221; salvos (multiple tests conducted close in time), 235–36; and seismic arrays, 149(figure), 149–50; and Soviet strategic weapons, 234; subcritical experiments, 224

  NPT. See Nonproliferation Treaty

  NRDC. See Natural Resources Defense Council

  NTM. See National Technical Means

  The Nuclear Express (Reed and Stillman), 14, 183

  Nuclear Test Ban: Converting Political Visions to Reality (Dahlman et al.), 139

  nuclear tests: and history of nuclear weapons development, 7–16; hydronuclear tests, 224–25; location of test sites, 15(figure); possible technical achievements for different yield ranges, 221–25; public opposition to, 19, 21, 92, 207; salvos (multiple tests conducted close in time), 235–36; television interview of 1986 on controversy over nuclear testing, 114–17. See also evasive testing; monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests; yield; specific countries and test sites; and following headings

  nuclear tests, atmospheric: banned by LTBT, 8, 21, 36; and infrasound detection, 21, 164; Soviet tests, 10, 12, 24, 29–30; and U.S. and Soviet proposals to halt testing, 20–21; U.S. tests, 10–12, 11(figure), 24–25

  nuclear tests, underground: and collapse of cavities, 49–50; containment issues, 134, 206–7, 229; craters produced by, 57(figure), 58, 84, 86, 88, 129, 179; and decoupling/muffling underground explosions (“big hole” hypothesis), 40–54 (see also decoupling/muffling underground explosions); detection of (see monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests); excluded from LTBT, 69; Soviet tests, 24, 46–49; U.S. overestimation of Soviet yields, 49, 55–61, 69–70, 91, 97, 99, 100, 232–34, 237; U.S. tests, 23–24, 41, 45–46, 49, 56–58, 80–82 (see also specific tests); U.S. tests in very small cavities, 50–51. See also evasive testing; Threshold Test Ban Treaty; specific test sites

  nuclear tests, underwater, 21, 23, 24

  nuclear tests, negotiations and debates over banning, xiv, 22; Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests (1958, 1959), 25–29; and missile defense, 248–49; negotiations and debates in the 1990s, 159–62; negotiations in the 1950s and early 1960s, 17–39; negotiations in the 1970s, 1–6, 91, 102, 126, 233; negotiations in the 1980s, 120, 136; pros and cons of banning nuclear tests, 17–20 (see also under Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). See also Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; Congress, U.S.; Threshold Test Ban Treaty; specific presidents

  nuclear war, dangers of, 12–13, 242–58; Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 31–32, 240–41; dangers of hair-trigger alerts and unauthorized launches, 242–44; and MIRVs, 38; nuclear winter, 251–55; and public opinion, 21; steps to reducing nuclear threat, 249–50; and tensions among India, China, and Pakistan, 180

  nuclear weapons: accidents and false alarms (1950–2007), 244–46; development of, 7–16; “low-yield” nuclear weapons, 216, 221–22; number in various countries, 15; one-point safety of, 224, 244; Soviet–U.S. parity in strategic nuclear weapons, 232–41. See also ICBMs; MIRVs; yield

  nuclear weapons laboratories, 7, 14, 33, 34, 35, 40, 84, 110, 196–97, 215–16

  nuclear weapons stockpile, 137–38, 215–16; and CTBT Senate debate, 197, 203–4; current status, 219–20; life extension programs (LEPs), 220; and NAS report of 2002, 213; and NAS report of 2012, 218–19; Stockpile Stewardship program, 195, 197, 199, 213, 219

  Nunn, Sam, 249

  Nuttli, Otto, 121, 122

  Obama, Barack, 199, 212, 217, 250–51

  Office of Technology Assessment (OTA): defunding of, 199–200; review of test ban issues (1986–1988), 118–19, 127, 128, 132–35, 142

  O’Leary, Hazel, 137

  Oliver, Jack, 65

  on-site inspections, 69, 87, 102; and CTBT, 19, 22, 162, 165, 203, 218; and LTBT, 33–34; on-site measurements of yield, 120–21

  Operation Hardtack, 24, 25, 29

  Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 7

  Pakistan, 37; Clinton and, 197; consequences of nuclear exchange with India, 254; and CTBT, xi, 6, 20, 162; and danger of transfer of nuclear technology to other actors, 183; earthquakes in, 183–84; identification limit for, 175; Khan and, 182–83; nonparticipation in international monitoring, 179; and NPT, 79; nuclear tests, 14, 170, 179, 181–84, 194; number of nuclear weapons, 15, 240; salt deposits in, 50; tensions with India, 178, 180–82, 240; unidentified seismic events/nuclear explosions, 192(figure), 193(figure)

  Pasyanos, Michael, 191

  Pauling, Linus, 21

  peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), xiv, 83–90; and India, 83–84, 180; purposes of, 83–85, 89, 90; and Soviet Union, xiv, 5, 43, 53, 83, 86(figure), 86–90; and U.S., 43, 83–86

  Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), 84, 87, 90, 104, 120, 126, 136

  Perle, Richard N., 114–17, 125

  Perry, William, 249

  Peurifoy, Bob, 215–16

  Phillips, Scott, 191

  Pickering, Thomas, 157

  Piel, Gerard, 127

  Pike, John, 111

  Piledriver test (1966), 52, 95

  Pincus, Walter, 233–34

  Pitman, Walter, 72

  plate tectonics, 69–70, 96, 188

  Plowshare program, 84

  plutonium pits, 219–20

  PNEs. See peaceful nuclear explosions

  PNET. See Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

  Pokhran test site, 179

  Pollack, J. B., 252–54

  Pomeroy, Paul, 66, 70

  Power, Thomas, 36

  President’s Science Advisory Panel (PSAC), 43

  Press, Frank, 100, 122

 
PSAC. See President’s Science Advisory Panel

  Punggye-ri test site, 175

  Putin, Vladimir, 251

  P waves. See seismic waves

  Radford, Arthur, 43

  radioactive fallout, 20; containment issues, 134, 206–7, 229; detection of radionuclides, 163–64, 170, 220–21; and LTBT, 36; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 85

  radiochemical method of yield measurement, 120

  Rainier test (1957), 23–24, 41, 43, 58

  Rayleigh waves, 71, 109–10

  Reagan, Ronald: and claims of Soviet cheating on TTBT, 59, 103, 105; and CTBT, 136; and missile defense, 246, 248; and PNET, 104; and SALT II, 234; and TTBT, 104–5, 120; and U.S.’s desire to continue testing, 131

  Reed, Thomas, 14, 183, 184–85

  Reynolds, John, 72

  Rich, J., 111

  Richards, Paul, 203; and identification of anomalous seismic events, 153, 154; and NAS report of 2002, 212; and NAS report of 2012, 218; and OTA panel, 118, 119; Seismology Seminar course, 138; studies of Indian explosions, 181; studies of North Korean explosions, 177; studies of Soviet explosions, 53, 124

  Richter, Charles, 27

  Ringdal, Frode, 53, 122, 123, 124, 155, 235

  Rio Blanco test (1973), 85

  Riznichenko, Y., 26

  Robinson, Paul, 204, 215, 225–26, 227

  Robock, A., 254

  rock types, 50, 55–58, 95; in Algeria, 101; and debate over yield calculations, 97; at Nevada Test Site, 23, 52, 56–58, 93, 97; in North Korea, 50, 176; at Soviet test sites, 24, 50, 56, 87–89, 97

  Rodean, Howard, 97, 101, 112

  Romney, Carl, 3, 9, 22, 23, 125; background and reputation, 73–74; and debate over yield calculations, 59, 60–61, 93–95, 98–99, 100; and evasive testing, 41–42; opposition to full test ban, 103; political influence of, 73–74, 94, 99; and SAIC (consulting firm), 136; and TTBT, 58

  Rowny, Edward, 3, 233

  Ruggi, Steven, 61

  Ruina, Jack, 186

  Rulison test (1969), 85

  Rusk, Dean, 34, 35

  Russia/Soviet Union: accusations of cheating during treaty negotiations, 30–31; atmospheric tests, 10, 12, 24, 29–30; breakup of Soviet Union, 64, 133; chemical explosions, 51–52, 152; claims (refuted) of cheating on test ban treaties, xiii, 59, 69, 91, 98, 103, 105, 110–11, 114–17, 119, 124–25, 151–57, 163–64; claims (refuted) of evasive decoupled testing, 52–53; claims (refuted) that 1997 earthquake in Kara Sea was a nuclear explosion, 151–57, 172; and CTBT, xi, 2, 102, 159, 215 (see also Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty); degraded weapons programs, 251; development and testing of nuclear weapons, 10, 12; downing of U-2 spy plane (1959), 28; and early proposals to halt testing, 20–22; earthquakes in, 63(figure), 64(figure), 133; end of moratorium on testing (1961), 29; ICBMs (SS-17, SS-18, SS-19), 31, 233–34, 237, 243; and missile defense, 248; and “missile gap,” 31; moratorium on testing (1958), 21, 29; moratorium on testing (1985), 131; and NAS report of 2012, 219; nuclear tests of 1961 and 1962, 29–31; number of nuclear weapons, 15, 238–40; peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), xiv, 5, 43, 53, 83–90, 86(figure); possible technical achievements for different yield ranges, 221–25; “problem” or “anomalous” events in (1972–2009), 143–58; seismic monitoring by U.S. scientists in the Soviet Union, 131–32; Soviet–U.S. parity in strategic nuclear weapons, 37, 232–41; subcritical experiments, 224; summary of weapons tests, 14; test sites (see Azgir test site; Novaya Zemlya test site; Semipalatinsk test site); and TTBT, xiv, 1–6, 103 (see also Threshold Test Ban Treaty); underground tests, 24, 46–49, 61 (see also specific test sites); underwater tests, 23; U.S. distrust of, 31, 34, 59; U.S. overestimation of Soviet yields, 49, 55–61, 69–70, 91, 97, 99, 100, 232–34, 237; withdrawal from START II following U.S. withdrawal from ABM Treaty, 215. See also nuclear tests, negotiations and debates over banning

  Ryall, Alan, 103, 145

  Sagan, C., 252–55

  SAIC (consulting firm), 136

  Salmon test (1964), 43, 45, 60, 85, 93, 109

  salt: and chemical explosions, 51–52; and decoupling/muffling underground explosions (“big hole” hypothesis), 46, 47(figure), 48(figure), 49–50, 87; location of salt deposits, 50, 88; and monitoring in the USSR, 128; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 83, 85, 88–89; testing in, 43, 49–50, 228, 230

  salvos (multiple tests conducted close in time), 235–36

  Sanity and Survival in the Nuclear Age: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace (Frank), 256

  satellite imaging, 164, 224; and anomalous events, 157; collapsed craters detected by, 57, 84, 86, 88, 89, 129, 179; and CTBT, 256; “double flash” detected (1979), 185–86; improved resolution, 164; and LTBT, 33; and monitoring India, 179, 181; and monitoring North Korea, 178; and National Technical Means, 33, 133; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 83, 84, 86, 88, 89; and refutation of “missile gap” claims, 31

  Savino, John, 71

  Scheber, Thomas, 225–26

  Schlesinger, James, 78, 208–9

  Schroeder, Gerhard, 207

  Scoville, Herbert, 76

  Scowcroft, Brent, 209

  S-CUBED (consulting firm), 136

  SDI. See Strategic Defense Initiative

  Seaborg, Glen, 28, 33–34, 102

  Sedan test (1962), 84

  seismic arrays, 122, 166–67, 179, 186; and identification of anomalous seismic events, 149–50, 153; and Novaya Zemlya test site, 149(figure), 149–50

  seismic magnitudes, 28–29; conversion of magnitude to yield, 29, 94–95 (see also yield); defined/described, 27–28; magnitude bias (mb bias), 94, 97, 101, 103–4, 123, 236–37; mbLg magnitude scale, 121–22; seismic magnitude mb, 28, 56, 58; and TTBT, 58; and U.S. overestimation of yields of Soviet underground tests, 55–61 (see also under yield); and variation in P wave propagation in upper mantle, 55, 58–61, 60(figure); and variation in rock type, 55–58

  Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing Treaties (OTA report of 1988), 118–19, 132–35, 142

  seismic waves, 23, 24(figure), 227; and debate over yield calculations, 93–98, 101, 103–4, 109–10, 111; detection of seismic surface waves from explosions, 65–66; first motions of seismic P waves, 64–65; and identification of anomalous seismic events, 143–44, 148, 150, 151(figure), 227; Lg waves, 121–26, 177; Love waves, 70–71, 110; Ms – mb method, 66–69, 67–68(figures), 143–44, 184; and plate tectonics, 69; Pn velocities, 96; pP waves, 23, 24(figure), 65; P waves and seismic magnitude mb, 28; P waves compared to Lg waves, 122; Rayleigh waves, 71, 109–10; use of high-frequency seismic waves for distinguishing nuclear tests from earthquakes (e.g., high-frequency P to S wave ratios), 129–30, 130(figure), 132, 134–36, 150, 151(figure), 153, 156, 170, 175, 176(figure), 177, 184, 187, 227; variation in P wave propagation in upper mantle, 55, 58–61, 60(figure)

  seismology, xii, 3; and crust and mantle studies aided by peaceful nuclear explosions, 89; determining depths of earthquakes and explosions, 62–64; development of new seismographs for nuclear verification, 70–72; lack of knowledge of, among hardline opponents of arms control, 114–17, 203; and plate tectonics, 69, 96; tectonic release, 94, 109–10. See also decoupling/muffling underground explosions; monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests

  Semipalatinsk test site (eastern Kazakhstan), 104, 109; calibration of test site, 121; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 108–9; and debate over yield calculations, 109–11, 113; and detection of chemical explosions, 214; first underground tests, 24, 25, 61; and hide-in-earthquake scenario, 77; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 86–88; published yields of nuclear tests, 234–35; rock types, 24, 97; seismic magnitudes for tests at, 106(figures); seismic monitoring of test site by U.S. scientists, 131–32; tectonic release at, 94, 109–10; as test site specified in TTBT, 92; unidentified seismic events/nuclear explosions, 193(figure)

  September 11, 2001, 117

  Shalikashvili, John, 211, 212, 215

  Sheaks, O. J., 216

  Shoal
test (1963), 95

  Shultz, George, 249

  Simmons, Eugene, 98, 99

  Singer, S. Fred, 255

  Smiling Buddha test (1980), 180

  Smith, Gordon, 209

  Smith, Harold, 154

  Smith, R. Jeffrey, 110, 154–57

  Solomon, Sean, 111

  Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 3

  South Africa: Israeli and South African nuclear cooperation, 185–86; nuclear program and destruction of inventory, 186–87; nuclear tests, 186; summary of weapons tests, 14

  Soviet Nuclear Weapons (Cochran et al.), 61

  Soviet Union. See Russia/Soviet Union

  Specter, Arlen, 209

  Springer, Donald, 3, 56, 58, 84, 96, 97, 101, 112, 126

  Sputnik, 31

  Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower (Killian), 44

  Stalin, Joseph, 10

  START II. See Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

  Sterling test (1966), 45, 46, 49, 89

  Stevenson, Adlai, 20

  Stillman, Danny, 14, 183, 184–85

  stockpile. See nuclear weapons stockpile

  Stockpile Stewardship program, 195, 197, 199, 213, 219

  Stoessel, Walter, 2, 3, 4

  Strassmann, Fritz, 8

  Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), 102, 215, 234

  Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 246

  Strauss, Lewis, 36, 43

  Sultanov, D. D., 53, 86, 89

  Suro, Robert, 202

  S waves. See Love waves; Rayleigh waves; seismic waves

  Sweden, 187

  Sykes, Lynn, xi–xv, 127; and AGU meeting of 2000, 216; and AGU symposium on verification (1983), 105, 107; and analysis of monitoring the Soviet Union (1983), 128–29; and anomalous seismic events, 144, 153–55; and Bache’s letter about high-frequency seismic monitoring, 134–36; background, 4; and congressional hearings (1985, 1986), 117–18; and CTBT Senate debate, 202, 203, 207–8; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 109; and DARPA panel meetings on yield determination, 111–14; and debate over yield calculations, 59, 60–61, 69–70, 91–92, 94–101, 103–5, 107, 109–10; and decoupling/muffling underground explosions (“big hole” hypothesis), 45, 48, 53–54; and FAS article (2000) on CTBT, 202, 203; and FAS earthquake article (1997), 202; and hearings on CTBT (1972), 76–78; and HGLP experiments, 71; and identification of underground explosions, 66; and monitoring aftershocks generated by Benhan test (1968), 80–82; and monitoring countries of special interest, 174–75, 183–84, 187–88, 194; and NAS report of 2002, 214; and NAS report of 2012, 218; and negotiations on Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1–6, 91; and NRDC, 131; and OTA’s independent review of test ban issues (1986–1988), 118–19; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 87; public involvement with test ban issues (1980s and 1990s), 138; recognition of contributions, 128; and refutation of claims of Russian cheating, 105, 110, 114–17, 119; Reviews of Geophysics article on verification (1987), 134; Scientific American article on verification (1982), 103, 104, 127–28; Scientific American article on yields of Soviet strategic weapons (1987), 232–37; Seismology Seminar course, 138; and television interview on controversy over nuclear testing (1986), 114–16