Silencing the Bomb Read online

  On October 8, 1999, the three directors of the U.S. nuclear weapons labs issued the following joint statement about the U.S. stockpile: “We, the three nuclear weapons laboratory directors, have been consistent in our view that the stockpile remains safe and reliable today. For the last three years, we have advised the Secretaries of Energy and Defense through the formal annual certification process that the stockpile remains safe and reliable and that there is no need to return to nuclear testing at this time. We have just forwarded our fourth set of certification letters to Energy and Defense Secretaries confirming our judgment that once again the stockpile is safe and reliable without nuclear testing. While there can never be a guarantee that the stockpile will remain safe and reliable indefinitely without nuclear testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will enable us to continue to maintain America’s nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing. If that turns out not to be the case, Safeguard F—which is a condition for entry into the Test Ban Treaty by the U.S.—provides for the President, in consultation with the Congress, to withdraw from the Treaty under the standard ‘supreme national interest’ clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.”

  In 1999 Fred Eimer of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated that, by presidential directive, an effective verification system “should be capable of identifying and attributing with high confidence evasively conducted nuclear explosions of about a few kilotons yield in broad areas of the globe.” That yield is far larger than that of a hydronuclear explosion with a nuclear yield of a few kilograms—that is, a few millionths of a kiloton. In his Senate testimony in 1999, Garwin stated, “Without nuclear tests of substantial yield, it is difficult to build compact and light fission weapons and essentially impossible to have any confidence in a large-yield two-stage thermonuclear weapon or hydrogen bomb. Can one be certain that a nation has not tested in the vast range between zero and the magnitude of tests that would be required to gain significant confidence in an approach to thermonuclear weaponry—say, 10 kilotons? No, but the utility of such tests to a weapons program has been thoroughly explored and found to be minimal.”

  On October 8, 1999, during the debate, Senator Lott cited many reasons for opposing the CTBT. On verification he said, “We know, however, that it is possible to conduct a nuclear test with the intention of evading systems designed to detect the explosion’s telltale seismic signature. This can be done through a technique known as ‘decoupling,’ whereby a nuclear test is conducted in a large underground cavity, thus muffling the test’s seismic evidences.” Lott went on to state, “In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations last year, Dr. Larry Turnbull, Chief Scientist of the Intelligence Community’s Arms Control Staff, said, ‘The decoupling scenario is credible for many countries for at least two reasons: First, the worldwide mining and petroleum literature indicates that construction of large cavities in both hard rock and salt is feasible, with costs that would be relatively small compared to those required for the production of materials for a nuclear device; second, literature and symposia indicate that containment of particulate and gaseous debris is feasible in both salt and hard rock.’”

  Lott added, “So not only is this ‘decoupling’ judged to be ‘credible’ by the Intelligence Community, but according to Dr. Turnbull, the technique can reduce a nuclear test’s seismic signature by up to a factor of 70. This means that a 70-kiloton test can be made to look like a 1-kiloton test, which the CTBT monitoring system will not be able to detect.” Senator Helms made similar remarks about evasion with a 60-kiloton nuclear test. He said, “Every country of concern to the U.S.—every one of them—is capable of decoupling its nuclear explosions…without detection by our country.”

  Lott also cited James Woolsey, Clinton’s first CIA director, “I do not believe that the zero level is verifiable. Not only because it is so low, but partially because of the capability a country has that is willing to cheat on such a treaty, of decoupling its nuclear tests by setting them off in caverns or caves and the like.” No one challenged these claims during the very short Senate hearings and debate. The general sense among the senators and their staffs who opposed the treaty was “just put it in a hole” and you can defeat the monitoring system. Examples of large underground facilities, such as the Washington, DC, metro stations, created the impression that such an undertaking was well within any group’s capability.

  These claims were in stark contrast to a joint public statement by the American Geophysical Union and the Seismological Society of America on October 6, 1999. It said in part, “The decoupling scenario, however, as well as other evasion scenarios, demand extraordinary technical expertise and the likelihood of detection is high. AGU and SSA believe that such technical scenarios are credible only for nations with extensive practical testing experience and only for yields of at most a few kilotons. Furthermore, no nation could rely upon successfully concealing a program of nuclear testing, even at low yields.”

  Woolsey had long been an opponent of a CTBT and other arms control agreements. His claim about setting off decoupled nuclear tests successfully in caves was incorrect. As already discussed in chapter 4, caves are typically too shallow to contain the radioactive particles and gases produced by even very tiny nuclear explosions. Large and deep caves are typically filled with water and would be difficult, if not impossible, to pump dry. Explosions in a water-filled cave or cavity are very well coupled, not muffled. Most caves have many openings to the atmosphere, some of which may not be known to a potential evader. A proposal to use an old salt mine at Lyons, Kansas, for the long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste was abandoned because all of the openings to the atmosphere could not be identified with confidence.

  Turnbull’s assertions cited by Senator Lott about decoupled testing—its feasibility, containment, and detection—are false for yields larger than one kiloton. Claims by Lott and Helms in 1999 that decoupled explosions of 60 and 70 kilotons are even feasible, let alone undetectable, were huge exaggerations.

  Turnbull’s opinions and great negative influence on the test ban debate were well known. He revealed his title at the CIA as early as 1992 in the published program for an international conference at Princeton on nuclear verification. I have known him, his professional background, and his views for decades and strongly believe that he should have been fired decades ago for his incompetence. One of my professional colleagues observed, “The bottom line is that in an important sense Turnbull is right. The U.S. cannot do a good job of CTBT verification. The reason is that people like Turnbull are in charge.”

  Among those who supported the treaty were French president Chirac, British prime minister Blair, and German chancellor Schroeder. They coauthored an op-ed article in the New York Times on October 8, 1999, in which they stated, “Failure to ratify the treaty will be a failure in the struggle against nuclear proliferation.” They contended the test ban treaty was verifiable.

  Kidder, von Hippel, and I wrote an op-ed article, “False Fears About a Test Ban,” in the Washington Post on October 10, 1999, during the Senate debate. We said in part, “More than 80 percent of the American people want a permanent ban on nuclear weapons tests, and support outside the United States is at least as high. This public support has powered the movement that persuaded the governments of 154 nations to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The arguments against the test ban treaty today are the same as those that opponents used to slow its progress for 40 years: the fear that other countries will cheat and be able to reap advantages from small clandestine tests, and the belief that the only way to make sure that a nuclear weapon works is to test it.

  “Still there is a possibility that a small nuclear test, carried out secretly away from monitored test sites, might escape detection. But what could be gained from such a test? Very little could be gained below the threshold for the ‘boosting’ of fission explosives. [Boosting] the yield with the fusion of a small am
ount of tritium-deuterium gas was the key step in the development of modern compact warheads, a ‘secret’ that has been officially declassified for decades. Testing boosting requires a nuclear explosion with a power of at least a few hundred tons of TNT, and full boosting gives yields of thousands of tons. This is beyond the level that could plausibly be concealed from U.S. seismic monitoring stations. The United States has done almost no testing for nuclear weapons development below 1,000 tons of TNT, so we can be comfortable with a ban on nuclear tests of all sizes.

  “The analyzed classified record shows that since the U.S. nuclear establishment mastered the art of designing boosted thermonuclear weapons more than two decades ago, there have been virtually no failures. On the surface, the debate over the nuclear test ban is about technical uncertainties. Below the surface, it is about competing priorities. Many test ban opponents care only that the United States be unconstrained in the development of nuclear weapons. If this country resumed testing, however, other countries would as well. They would improve their nuclear weapons much more than we would and the world would be pushed back closer to nuclear weapons use.”

  Senator Kyl of Arizona spoke first against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty during the Senate debate, which started on October 8. He said that if the treaty were passed, the United States would not be able to test to assure the safety and effectiveness of American nuclear weapons. He also said, “Our intelligence agencies lack the ability to confidently detect low-yield test[s].”

  On the same day, President Clinton, visiting Canada, said, “I hope that the Senate will reach an agreement to delay the vote and to establish an orderly process, a non-political orderly process, to systematically deal with all the issues…. we’ve been trying to have a debate on this for two years, but it is clear now that the level of opposition to the treaty and the time it would take to craft the necessary safeguards to get the necessary votes are simply not there.” I think he should have been in Washington during the CTBT debate. Nevertheless, three officials in his administration spoke at length at a news conference about the advantages of a CTBT. They did not cover verification or the possibilities of cheating very well.

  Former secretary of defense and former CIA director James Schlesinger called those who wanted to move away from nuclear weapons unrealistic “abolitionists” who did not grasp the importance of maintaining a reliable deterrent for decades to come. Schlesinger, who testified against the treaty and has long been an opponent of test bans, said it might not pose a substantial threat to American security for some years, “but the real questions come after about 2020,” when America’s overwhelming conventional military superiority may have eroded and new players on the world stage could threaten the United States. If the U.S. military were locked into a permanent test ban treaty, Schlesinger complained, its options could be dangerously limited. He argued that it was vital to retain the right to test and improve the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Only actual test explosions, he said, could confirm the dependability of the American deterrent and convince both friends and foes in decades to come that U.S. nuclear weapons remained operational. The high-level positions he held made him a strong voice in defeating the CTBT. He died in March 2014.

  Writing in the Washington Post on October 13 just before the Senate vote, Robert Kaiser said that Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President George H. W. Bush and a weathered veteran of the arms control wars, complained, “We still think of arms control in Cold War terms. We have not changed at all, and yet the world has changed dramatically.” Kaiser continued, “The debate in the Senate, Scowcroft added, ‘is pathetic.’ Scowcroft said he hoped for a debate some day that would connect the test ban treaty to a realistic assessment of what the United States can do to ensure ‘security and stability.’ That means looking carefully at how various policies will affect the thinking of potential rivals or potential nuclear powers, and deciding what kind of U.S. arsenal best suits national interests. Scowcroft had formally recommended that the Senate put the treaty aside. ‘Let’s wait until after this partisan period has passed and we can debate it sensibly,’ he said, hopefully.”

  The treaty went down to defeat on October 13, 1999, by a majority vote of fifty-one to forty-eight, far fewer than the two-thirds, or sixty-seven votes, needed for the Senate’s advice and consent. It was largely, but not completely, a party-line vote, with forty-four Democrats voting for the treaty. No Democrats voted no, but Senator Byrd voted present. Republicans Chafee, Spector, Jeffords, and Smith voted for the CTBT. Jeffords and Spector, moderate Republicans, each gave long, thoughtful speeches and wrote op-ed articles on the value of the treaty. Jeffords later switched to the Democratic Party.

  POSTMORTEM

  The CTBT is likely the most important treaty to be defeated since the Senate’s vote against the Versailles Treaty in March 1920 and against U.S. participation in the League of Nations. The day after the Senate’s defeat of the CTBT, presidential candidate Al Gore, then the vice president, vowed to push for its ratification.

  Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced on November 11, 1999, that the Clinton administration “will establish a high-level Administration task force to work closely with the Senate on addressing the issues raised during the test ban debate.” While Albright reiterated many of the arguments for a CTBT, she and others said nothing about the leaks of information to the press about alleged nuclear tests by Russia and China prior to and during the Senate debate. A strong rebuttal was needed, but not given, to the Washington Post article of September 1999 stating that the CIA had concluded it could not monitor low-level nuclear tests by Russia precisely enough to ensure compliance with the CTBT.

  I have saved electronic copies of many letters to editors, communications among treaty supporters, speeches on the Senate floor, and copies of a letter I sent in November 1999 to Senators Biden, Levin, and Moynihan about misleading and incorrect statements about verification during the CTBT debate of 1999. They will be deposited at the Rare Book and Manuscript Library of Columbia University. Speeches in the Senate can be found in the Congressional Record, Senate.

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  THE CTBT TASK FORCE AND THE 2002 AND 2012 REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

  THE CTBT TASK FORCE

  In January 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced that former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired General John Shalikashvili, had agreed to serve as an adviser to President Clinton and to her in order to spearhead the administration’s effort to achieve bipartisan support for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) after its defeat in the U.S. Senate the year before.

  Shalikashvili agreed to reach out to senators to find ways to narrow differences over the CTBT. He met for the first time in March 2000 with his CTBT task force. In a speech that month he stated, “I remain convinced that the United States will be safer with this important treaty than without it. True, potential proliferators can make simple fission bombs without testing. But a test ban makes it much harder to get nuclear weapons down to the sizes, the shapes and the weights most dangerous to us: deliverable in light airplanes, rudimentary missiles, or even in a terrorist’s luggage.”

  On April 20, Shalikashvili indicated that it might well be necessary to attach conditions and understandings to the U.S. signing statement for the CTBT to convince senators to agree to ratification of the pact. The main concerns that he found after meeting with various senators who had voted against the CTBT in 1999 were: (1) the Treaty should not be of indefinite duration; (2) the United States should wait until the Stockpile Stewardship Program is completed; and (3) a treaty with a zero yield cannot be verified. He commented that he did not expect the Senate to act on the treaty in the remainder of 2000 and that his goal was to work toward developing “a more reasoned judgment” in the next administration.

  FIRST STUDY BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

  To support his efforts, General Shalikashvili commissioned several studies, including one started in April 20
00 with the U.S. National Academies to address major technical issues that had arisen during the 1999 Senate debate. Its mandate was confined to a specific set of important technical questions. The Academies were not asked to provide an overall “net assessment” of whether the CTBT was in the national security interest of the United States, which they did not do. The official government sponsor of the first study was the Department of State, with additional funding from the Department of Energy, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and several U.S. foundations.

  For this study and another a decade later, the NAS turned to its standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), created in 1980. In 2000 CISAC picked members of the first CTBT study, with John Holdren of Harvard University as chair. Holdren, who later became President Barack Obama’s science adviser, had been involved for many years in arms control and energy issues. The committee contained members with special expertise, including those from academia, high-ranking retired military officers, persons involved in past arms control negotiations, and former officials of the weapons laboratories. The members also were chosen with regard for appropriate balance, including geophysicist Raymond Jeanloz from UC Berkeley and my seismological colleague Paul Richards from Columbia University.

  After the committee signed off on a draft document in December 2000, its report, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, then entered an extended process of multiagency classification review and peer review by the National Academies. The committee held extensive unclassified and classified meetings. General Shalikashvili was briefed by the committee at the classified level prior to the end of Clinton’s presidency. An unclassified report with a classified annex was published in 2002 during the Bush administration.