Silencing the Bomb Read online

  4. The continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.

  5. The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs.

  6. The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE)—advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE’s nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command—that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with the Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard “supreme national interests” clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.

  Similar safeguards had been adopted when the Limited Test Ban Treaty was submitted to the Senate in 1963.

  In September 1997, Senator Joseph Biden made a major speech emphasizing the value of the treaty to U.S. national security. He said, “The time has come, Mr. President, to move ahead on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as other arms control initiatives and NATO enlargement.” Several other senators spoke in favor of the CTBT later that fall.

  The Congress Daily reported on November 25, 1997, “Key Senator, Pete Domenici, Hesitates In Supporting CTBT”…A key Republican senator this week said his support for a nuclear test ban treaty depends on increased funding for federal energy laboratories, two of which are located in his home state of New Mexico.” Richard Garwin, a physicist who has long been involved in the control of nuclear weapons, and I visited Domenici’s Senate office shortly afterward to discuss the seismic event of August 1997 and to assure him that it was not a Russian nuclear explosion. Nevertheless, Domenici followed party discipline and voted against the treaty in 1999.

  In February 1998, President Clinton visited the Los Alamos nuclear weapons lab, where he told employees, “The test ban treaty will hold other nations to the same standards we already observe.” He visited a day after proposing additional funding to the weapons labs for work to assure that the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons would work in the future without nuclear testing. That program, Stockpile Stewardship, called for $4.5 billion per year to be spent at the labs on the fastest computers in the world, new major high-energy facilities to retain capabilities in nuclear science, and better documentation of existing weapons and past tests. Clinton also proposed a package of safeguards to expand intelligence and the monitoring of other countries’ nuclear programs. He pledged that the United States would reserve the right to resume nuclear tests if the safety of the nuclear stockpile could no longer be certified.

  Clinton’s trip to New Mexico, an attempt to pacify hardline opponents, was regarded as a respite from Washington, where he faced a barrage of questions about his sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky. That affair and the subsequent attempt to impeach him undoubtedly negatively affected many of his proposals, including ratification of the CTBT. The Senate’s negative vote in 1999 has aspects of attacking Clinton when he was weak politically. Some people commented that all Republicans hated Clinton whereas only half hated the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

  In May 1998, Clinton criticized India and Pakistan soon after their nuclear tests, citing the dangers they posed to one another and to the rest of South Asia. In July 1999, he congratulated Brazil on its ratification of the CTBT. Clinton stated, “Brazil’s action today to ratify the CTBT makes it all the more important for the United States to do the same. I call on our Senate to act expeditiously to approve the CTBT—already signed by 149 nations and supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—so that the United States can lead in this vital endeavor.”

  Republicans controlled the Senate in 1998 as well as during the debate and vote on the CTBT in 1999. In the wake of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests of May 1998, Senate majority leader Trent Lott and Foreign Relations Committee chair Jesse Helms claimed that a ban on nuclear testing was “irrelevant” and that the Senate should not even debate the CTBT. Helms served notice that he would not move toward ratification of the CTBT until amendments to the Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty were debated. He hoped the ABM Treaty would be defeated by the Senate. Lott also suggested that U.S. policy should shift from pressing for a CTBT to the construction of “effective missile defenses,” claiming that “the Administration’s push for the CTBT led to the [Indian and Pakistani] nuclear tests.” Helms also called for the defeat of the Kyoto agreement on global warming.

  Many articles supporting the CTBT were published in the United States during 1999. Several senators, scientists, and arms control specialists refuted the views of Lott and Helms in the media and in the Congress. Among them was an op-ed article in the Washington Post on June 11 titled “This Treaty Must Be Ratified,” by Sidney Drell of Stanford and Paul Nitze. Nitze was a former arms control negotiator and an ambassador-at-large in the Reagan administration. They noted that other arms control treaties had been brought before the Senate, whereas that body had failed to consider the CTBT for two and a half years after Clinton signed it at the UN. They commented, “The president rightly has referred to the CTBT as the ‘longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control.’”

  Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated at a hearing chaired by Senator Helms on May 26, 1999, that he was positive on missile defense. Senator Frist then asked him about the test ban, noting the “constraints” it would place on the United States. Kissinger said, “I think we have an arms control objective, and must have, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And anything that makes it more difficult to develop more nuclear weapons, I would, in principle, favor.” He later said he thought the CTBT was a poor treaty.

  Daryl Kimball of the Physicians for Social Responsibility became the executive director of a task force on the CTBT, called the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. It represented a number of arms control organizations in the United States. On June 15, 1999, Kimball sent a letter to President Clinton signed by thirty-five heads of organizations and former government officials urging a substantial presidential campaign on behalf of the CTBT. The letter asked the president to do the following:

  1. Present your case for CTBT ratification directly to the public and invite bipartisan support for its consideration and approval on a frequent and consistent basis.

  2. Appoint a high-level, full-time CTBT coordinator to strengthen and focus administration-wide efforts and to signal the seriousness with which you plan to pursue ratification.

  3. Direct key cabinet members and high-profile CTBT supporters to pursue a sustained, public campaign to increase support and win Senate approval for the treaty.

  While Clinton himself seemed to be familiar with the main test ban issues during the period leading up to the Senate vote, his administration unfortunately did not adopt any of these measures. Likewise, the Obama administration did not adopt any of the three suggestions despite making general statements about the need for the Senate to ratify the treaty and its value to national security.

  Many proponents of the CTBT cited polls indicating wide public support in the United States for the treaty, some as high as 82 percent. In a speech on July 27, 1999, Senator Biden, the ranking minority member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, “Listen to the American People. I know that some of my colleagues have principled objections to this treaty. I respect their convictions, even though I strongly believe they are wrong on this issue. Some of my colleagues believe nuclear weapons tests are essential to preserve our nuclear deterrent. Both I and the directors of our three nuclear weapons laboratories disagree. The $45 billion [for ten years] ‘Stockpile Stewardship’ program enables us to maintain the safety and reliab
ility of our nuclear weapons without weapons tests.” He also noted, “Support for ratification is not limited, moreover, to the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The four previous Chairmen also support ratification.”

  The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was established in 1972 to provide Congress with assessments of various scientific and technical proposals that were relevant to hearings and legislation. OTA was defunded during the period of Newt Gingrich’s Republican majority rule in the House of Representatives, often referred to as the “Contract with America.” OTA closed in September 1995. Its demise was a blow to further scientific and technical assessments of the CTBT and other arms control issues. In July 2010 the House voted 235 to 176 to reject a proposed amendment to restore OTA.

  The New York Times reported on August 30, 1999, that Democrats were threatening to bring the Senate to a standstill when Congress returned the following month from summer recess unless Republicans agreed to hold hearings that year on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The article quoted Senator Biden: “But the President has to play a major role. He could affect this more than he has.” The Times went on to state, “Administration officials say that in the coming weeks, Clinton and top foreign policy aides, like Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger, will push the treaty more publicly.”

  SHORT SENATE HEARINGS AND DEBATE

  Many Democrats and other supporters assumed the treaty would readily pass the Senate if Helms and Lott released their lock on it. Unfortunately, that was not the case. As Senate majority leader, Lott had major control over bringing bills and treaties to the floor of the Senate. On September 30, he suddenly proposed short hearings, ten hours of debate, and a vote as early as October 5 on the CTBT. Early October gave the Clinton administration too little time to push more actively for the treaty. Lott claimed that he had the votes to defeat the treaty, which soon turned out to be correct.

  Senators Helms and Lott argued on the Senate floor on October 1, 1999, that the Foreign Relations Committee had held hearings in which the treaty was mentioned. They offered a unanimous consent resolution [my italics] for a vote on final passage of the CTBT on October 7, 1999. Unanimous consent requires that all senators present vote for such a resolution. In an exchange in the Senate, Democratic minority leader Thomas Daschle objected to Lott’s offer, saying it gave short shrift to a landmark pact. He requested more time for debate and a later date for the vote.

  Some senators, however, urged Daschle to accept the offer to bring it to a vote. Senator Biden told reporters, “This is not the best way to deal with this, but it’s better than nothing.” He urged the president to “pull out all the stops” and to hold a news conference and a nationally televised address. Some senators feared that a vote now would doom the treaty, while others said they were ready to “roll the dice,” even if they lacked the votes. A number thought that votes against the treaty would reflect badly on Republican senators who were up for reelection in November, but this proved not to be the case. In retrospect, the vote to defeat the treaty a week later turned out to be worse than nothing.

  On October 1, Senators Lott and Daschle agreed to a revised unanimous consent resolution that included fourteen hours of general Senate debate on the CTBT, starting on October 8 and resuming on October 12, with a vote taking place that day or soon thereafter. Every Democrat in the Senate endorsed the timing, a major mistake. The Democrats, probably unaware of how dire their situation was, were trapped by their own rhetoric. How could they back out now? Senator Jon Kyl, a treaty opponent said, “It was plain arrogance…. They didn’t have any idea they wouldn’t win.”

  Attempts were made soon after passage of that resolution to postpone the vote and to have more time for testimony and debate. Senators John Warner, a Virginia Republican, and Patrick Moynihan, a New York Democrat, released a letter to their two leaders, endorsing efforts to delay Senate action on the treaty until the next Congress convened in 2001. About a dozen senators signed the letter. Most Democratic senators and the president, though, seemed to have been caught off guard about changing the unanimous consent resolution. It was soon clear that senators James Inhofe and Jon Kyl, who wanted to defeat the treaty, would not accept postponements. Hence, unanimous consent could not be reached to postpone the vote, and it went ahead.

  The New York Times reported the day after the vote, “In a last-ditch effort to save the treaty, Clinton called the Republican leader, Trent Lott, two hours before the vote and asked that he delay action for national security reasons. In a blunt rebuff, Lott said the President had offered too little, too late, and he pushed ahead with an action that he knew would humiliate Clinton.”

  In the weeks before the vote, I talked several times by phone with Daryl Kimball, who headed the CTBT task force of nongovernmental organizations, and suggested that he enlist the support of Republican moderates, such as the two senators from Maine. He thought that was not needed. In retrospect, it is clear that many senators who were thought to be undecided had already made up their minds to vote against the CTBT. Democrats and other supporters of the treaty were unaware of that development.

  During the brief Senate debate, lack of verifiability and concern about the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons were cited repeatedly. Not emphasizing verification surprised many of us because an elaborate International Monitoring System (IMS) had been set up under the 1996 treaty. In addition, the United States possessed many other monitoring tools, so-called National Technical Means (NTM).

  The negative views should have come as no surprise given repeated claims by treaty opponents stretching back to 1954 that other nations, particularly the Soviet Union and China, would cheat and the United States would not be able to detect their nuclear tests, especially those conducted evasively. I said in my FAS article, “Concerns about verifiability as well as the reliability of weapons in the U.S. stockpile, in fact, have long served as proxies for the larger issues of what best ensures U.S. national security and prevents nuclear war.”

  On October 3, 1999, the Washington Post published on its front page one of the most damaging articles to ratification of the treaty by Robert Suro. In “CIA Is Unable to Precisely Track Testing,” he stated that the CIA had concluded that it could not monitor low-level nuclear tests by Russia precisely enough to ensure compliance with the CTBT. He went on to say that twice in September 1999, “the Russians carried out what might have been nuclear explosions at its Novaya Zemlya testing site in the Arctic.” Bill Gertz of the Washington Times also published allegations of nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya in 1999 just as the CTBT debate was heating up. Gertz’s comments at a critical time in the CTBT debate have much the same flavor as his claims that the Kara Sea earthquake of August 1997 was a Russian nuclear explosion, which it clearly was not. Suro said congressional staffers [all of whom worked for Republicans] were briefed on the new CIA assessment before Lott scheduled the vote on the CTBT. Those giving false information to Suro obviously had little knowledge of how well Novaya Zemlya was being monitored.

  In my FAS article of March 2000 I stated, “We know now that Senators Cloverdell and Kyl, who strongly opposed the Treaty, and their staffs worked in secret for months to compile briefing books of materials opposing the CTBT before Lott’s sudden announcement. Marshall Billingslea of Senator Helm’s staff stated he worked exclusively for two years on arguments to defeat the Treaty. His materials, which were not reviewed, were made available to Senators likely to vote against the CTBT but not to Democrats or other Republicans who were either likely to vote in favor or leaned toward ratification. Letters opposing the Treaty that were obtained from several former national security and defense officials were cited repeatedly in the Senate debate.” Helms and Lott worked long and hard in secret to gather votes against the CTBT. In essence, they conducted a successful ambush.

  Although officials in the Clinton administration cited the CTBT as one of the president’s top foreign policy priorities, little was done unti
l after Lott’s announcement to aggressively promote the treaty in the Senate, especially among moderate Republicans, or to describe its main benefits. No high-level official in the executive branch was designated to promote and organize support for the CTBT. Most proponents of the treaty only began active efforts on its behalf a few days before the short Senate hearings.

  The hearings before Senate committees did not do justice to accomplishments in stockpile stewardship and especially to nuclear verification. Physicists Sidney Drell and Richard Garwin spoke about the stockpile. Only one witness, General John Gordon, deputy director of the CIA, testified about verification, and that was in a closed secret session. I am not aware that he was an expert on verification, especially seismic identification and evasive testing. My colleague Paul Richards wrote to me, “Current unclassified methods monitor that site [Novaya Zemlya] down to about 0.01 kt. It would not surprise me to learn that a much larger number was indicated to Sen. Warner’s committee last Tuesday.”

  Drell stated, “This treaty can be effectively verified. With the full power of its international monitoring system and protocols for on-site inspection, we will be able to monitor nuclear explosive testing that might undercut our own security in time to take prompt and effective counteraction.” In contrast, Paul Robinson, director of the Sandia National Laboratory, testified, “If the United States scrupulously restricts itself to zero-yield while other nations may conduct experiments up to the threshold of international detectability, we will be at an intolerable disadvantage.” Intolerable is a strong word. Robinson, in fact, is not an expert on verification but on the design of weapons. It is highly likely he was not aware of how good verification was in 1999.

  Robinson continues his long opposition to a CTBT today, even though detection and identification thresholds have continued to get much better. When seismic and other monitoring technologies improved significantly at various times during the past forty years, Robinson and others claimed in hearings that we still must do better. While Robinson and some others apparently believed that a few kilograms of nuclear explosive yield would be of great military advantage to some countries, other scientists with similar high-level clearances strongly disagreed.