Silencing the Bomb Read online

  Bravo produced large amounts of radioactive fallout, of which the nearby Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon received high levels. Twenty-three of its crew developed radiation sickness by the time the boat docked in Japan. Its captain died of leukemia six months later. Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the first proposal that year for a halt to and a ban on nuclear testing.

  The Soviets had not sat idle. They detonated two fission explosions in 1951 and their first thermonuclear device, with a yield of 400 kilotons, on August 12, 1953. Seismic stations in the United States and abroad recorded the test. In 1955 the USSR detonated a weaponized version of the 1953 device, with a yield of 215 kilotons, and their first thermonuclear device with a yield exceeding one megaton.

  In 1957 and 1958 the Soviet Union and the United States conducted many thermonuclear tests, a number them in the megaton range. In 1952 the United Kingdom tested its first fission device, and in 1957 its first hydrogen bomb.

  A megaton nuclear explosion would cause damage and deaths over a huge area from thermal radiation (heat), the atmosphere blast wave, and high-energy radiation, as illustrated in figure 2.2 for the New York City area.

  FIGURE 2.2

  Nuclear firestorm created by the detonation of an 800-kiloton weapon above New York City. M denotes midtown Manhattan. No one survives in the central fire zone (area 90 square miles, or 23,000 hectares) that includes most of the island of Manhattan; a firestorm is likely in the larger shaded area.

  Computations courtesy of Theodore Postol of MIT, 2016.

  SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS BY VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND LONG-RANGE (STRATEGIC) NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

  Without testing, a country cannot be certain that a new nuclear weapon will work. Of course, many weapons would not have entered the stockpiles of various nations if a full ban on testing had been enacted in 1963, not when it was finally signed in 1996.

  Table 2.1 lists the first fission test, the first fusion (hydrogen bomb) explosion, and the last underground test by the various nuclear powers as of late 2016. They have now conducted a total of more 2000 nuclear tests.

  TABLE 2.1 Number of Nuclear Tests and Dates as of September 2016

  COUNTRY FIRST FISSION TEST FIRST FUSION TEST MOST RECENT TEST TOTAL TESTS

  United States 1945 1952 September 1992 1030*

  Russia 1949 1953 October 1990 715*

  United Kingdom 1952 1958 October 1991 45**

  France 1960 1968 January 1996 210

  China 1964 1967 July 1996 45

  India 1974 May 1998 4–6

  Pakistan May 1998 May 1998 2–6

  Israel & South Africa? September 1979? September 1979?

  North Korea October 2006 September 2016 5

  * Some tests involved two or more explosions close in time and location.

  ** Twenty-four were joint tests with the United States.

  In their 2009 book The Nuclear Express, Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman argue that many of the countries that acquired nuclear weapons did so with the help of other nations. Nuclear weapons designers Reed and Stillman worked at the Livermore and Los Alamos weapons laboratories. Scientists from the United Kingdom helped develop the U.S. atomic bombs at Los Alamos and hence knew much about their design. The Soviet Union acquired the design of its first device from the United States by espionage. China initially received help from the USSR on its atomic bomb before Russia cut off aid over fear of what Mao might do with atomic weapons.

  Reed and Stillman state that Britain aided France with the design of its hydrogen bomb; France helped Israel with its atomic weapons program. India obtained plutonium for its 1974 nuclear test from a reactor that Canada and the United States had supplied it under the Atoms for Peace program. They also conclude that the first Pakistani atomic device likely was tested at China’s Lop Nor site in 1990, but others disagree with their claim. Pakistani engineer A. Q. Khan transferred uranium enrichment technology to Libya, Iran, North Korea, and perhaps other states.

  Table 2.2 lists the numbers of nuclear warheads of nine countries. Those that can be delivered at a moment’s notice are classified separately from those (“other”) held in reserve or being dismantled. Note that Russia and the United States have by far the greatest numbers of nuclear weapons. Figure 2.3 shows the sites of nuclear weapons tests.

  TABLE 2.2 Numbers of Nuclear Weapons of Various Countries as of 2013

  COUNTRY DEPLOYED OTHER TOTAL 2012 TOTAL 2013

  United States 2150 5550 8000 7700

  Russia 1800 6700 10,000 8500

  United Kingdom 160 65 225 225

  France 290 10 300 300

  China 250 240 250

  India 90–110 80–100 90–110

  Pakistan 100–120 90–110 100–120

  Israel 80 80 80

  North Korea 2 3

  Total* 4400 12,865 19,000 17,265

  *Totals from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook, 2013 (http://www.sipriyearbook.org).

  FIGURE 2.3

  Areas where nuclear explosives have been tested. The figure also includes the Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions of 1945. Sites of Soviet and U.S. peaceful nuclear explosions are not shown. Whether a nuclear explosion was tested at the site shown in the southwestern Indian Ocean is discussed later.

  Source: atomicarchive.com.

  3

  FROM THE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS TO HALT NUCLEAR TESTING TO THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963

  I highlight here some of the proposals, negotiations, and problems in working toward either a limited (LTBT) or a full comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT) during the administrations of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy.

  Following a call by India’s Prime Minister Nehru in 1954 for a pause in nuclear testing, several other countries presented proposals for a halt in testing. Formal negotiations toward a test ban began in the second half of the 1950s and continued into the early 1960s.

  PROS AND CONS OF BANNING NUCLEAR TESTS

  Debate has raged for more than sixty years over whether a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the interest of the United States. I touch here briefly on some of the main reasons a CTBT has been either proposed or opposed.

  It should be remembered that a CTBT involves a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, not a ban on their delivery systems such as aircraft and missiles. It does not prohibit the manufacture of additional weapons that have already been tested. While a CTBT is an important step, it is but one component of an overall effort to control nuclear arms. A CTBT may help to promote other arms control initiatives and agreements.

  Many of the arguments for and against a CTBT (see Table 3.1) have been enunciated for decades. Some are new with the 1996 treaty. It is important to note that verification capabilities have increased, especially in the past twenty years.

  TABLE 3.1 Pros and Cons of Banning Nuclear Tests

  PRO CON

  1. The U.S. lead in nuclear weapons will diminish without a CTBT. Others will cheat and erode the U.S. lead. National security is best enhanced by continued testing of new weapons.

  2. The treaty will slow or halt the nuclear arms race (stop continued development of weapons by nuclear powers; stop new states from testing and acquiring nuclear arms). This is wishful thinking.

  3. The treaty is verifiable down to explosions of very tiny yields, which are not of military significance. Even an explosion between zero and a few hundred tons’ yield gives an advantage to others. Determined cheaters will test important weapons evasively below verification limits.

  4. The treaty is for zero nuclear yield. The lower yield limit is vague; it should be a low yield threshold treaty.

  5. Russia and China are unlikely to be able to deploy a new long-range nuclear weapon without several multi-kiloton tests, which would be detectable even with evasive testing. Tactical and other weapons with yields below one kiloton are important (x-ray laser, electromagnetic pulse warhead).

  6. The Stockpile Stewardship program is mo
re effective than originally thought. The program is not good enough without the ability to test existing and new weapons.

  7. U.S. classified verification capabilities are better than the International Monitoring System (IMS). The United States makes its own determinants for a suspicious event. The IMS is not good enough. The United States will surrender assessment of an event as being nuclear to the IMS and the UN.

  8. The United States can pursue a few arms control agreements simultaneously. Strategic arms limitations are more important than test bans.

  9. Tests of thermonuclear weapons are unlikely to be concealable even with evasive testing. This would end development of advanced types of weapons. Weapons labs need testing to retain top scientists.

  10. If problems occur with existing weapons, the United States can withdraw from the treaty within six months. To prevent deterioration of weapons, nuclear testing is necessary.

  11. On-site inspections are possible once the treaty enters into force. The UN General Assembly could bring it into force without rogue states once the United States and China ratify. Entry into force will never occur because forty-four countries must ratify the CTBT.

  12. Components of nuclear explosives can be remanufactured and old components replaced. Some components of nuclear explosives cannot be remanufactured.

  13. It is illusory to believe that amendments to the treaty, such as making it of limited duration, can be negotiated with other signatories. The U.S. Senate should enact U.S. safeguards. The treaty should be amended to make it of limited duration.

  14. The treaty helps to establish the norm that the only value of nuclear weapons is for deterring their use by others. Other countries and terrorists may not accept this view. Rogue nations will test. Nuclear weapons are needed to attack chemical and biological weapons.

  15. U.S policy is that it does not need new nuclear weapons. The United States should develop and test new nuclear weapons; requirements change.

  16. The treaty will strengthen international peace and security. International support for the treaty is very strong. This is a false hope.

  17. U.S., Russian, and Chinese weapons are already one-point safe; hence, they do not need tiny nuclear warheads. To improve safety, add insensitive high explosives to submarine warheads.

  In addition to the statements listed in Table 3.1, several domestic arguments have been made for U.S. ratification of a complete test ban.

  1. A CTBT is favored by a vast majority of Americans. Polls indicate that few people in the United States know that the Senate defeated the CTBT in 1999.

  2. The United States would miss an historic opportunity to make the world safer for future generations.

  3. Failure to ratify the CTBT would weaken the effectiveness of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Some nations may withdraw. (Thus far, however, only North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT.)

  4. Failure to ratify would undercut the status of America as a world leader. Global standards do matter.

  5. U.S. ratification may dissuade others such as India and Pakistan from conducting more tests. (They have not tested since 1998. Only North Korea has tested nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century.)

  U.S. AND SOVIET PROPOSALS TO HALT TESTING

  In July 1955 and again in 1956, Premier Nikolai Bulganin of the USSR proposed an end to nuclear testing. His plan, however, did not include verification. Understandably, the United States argued for verification of arms control agreements, especially those related to nuclear weapons. In 1955 the declared aim of the United States was to seek a comprehensive disarmament agreement that included verification.

  The U.S. position on halting or limiting nuclear testing underwent several changes during the Eisenhower administration, which ran from 1953 through early 1961. In 1956 Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic nominee for president, suggested the United States might stop testing as a first step toward an agreement with the USSR. He reasoned that the United States could verify a ban on high-yield testing, ending the worst dangers of radioactive fallout.

  The radioactive isotope strontium 90 produced by testing in the atmosphere was detected in human bones and teeth worldwide in the 1950s. Since the chemistry of strontium is similar to that of calcium, humans adsorb radioactive strontium (Sr 90) as if it were calcium in dairy and other foods. Sr 90 has a half-life of about twenty-eight years. (A half-life is the time it takes for a radioactive isotope to decay to half its original concentration.) Hence, it takes two hundred years for Sr 90 to decay to 1 percent of its initial value. In 1959 Lamont geochemist Larry Kulp and his colleagues, who made many of the measurements on human bones, published their results in the journal Science, drawing public and governmental attention to the issue of fallout from atmospheric testing.

  By 1957 a number of scientists, public figures, and various organizations demanded an end to nuclear testing. Chemist and Nobel Laureate Linus Pauling of Cal Tech circulated a petition calling for a test ban; nine thousand scientists in forty-three countries signed it. In the United States, SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, placed ads in major newspapers citing the perils of nuclear war. Thousands of letters protesting continued nuclear testing were sent to President Eisenhower. Many nongovernmental organizations in the United States and the UK who protested against continued testing became active at that time.

  In May 1957, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged proposals for a test ban and cutoffs in the production of materials for nuclear weapons but failed to reach an agreement. In March 1958, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral suspension of testing after completing its latest series of many atmospheric nuclear explosions. It urged the United States to do likewise. It came just as the United States was about to start a major series of weapons tests in the Pacific and at the Nevada Test Site. On April 8, 1958, President Eisenhower proposed a technical conference to explore the verification of a test ban.

  Many people are not aware that Eisenhower and his administration were very involved in several proposals and negotiations to ban or limit nuclear testing. President Kennedy is often cited for achieving, as he did in 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, often called the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). It did not cover underground testing. Nevertheless, much work on testing limitations and verification occurred during Eisenhower’s presidency.

  EARLY ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY NUCLEAR TESTS

  The first Soviet test in 1949 resulted in an expansion of a variety of monitoring technologies by the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. These included seismic stations, infrasound detectors for low-frequency acoustic waves in the atmosphere, hydrophones for detecting explosions in the oceans, and instruments for detecting explosions in the upper atmosphere and space.

  In July and August 1958, a Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests was held in Geneva. It was often called the Conference of Experts. Western delegations were from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France; eastern delegates were from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland. James Fisk, a senior scientist and administrator at Bell Labs, headed the U.S. delegation; William Penny, the British. Supporting the U.S. delegation were a number of advisers, including five seismologists and a number of scientists familiar with nuclear weapons programs. Yevgeni Fedorov, a Soviet geophysicist, headed the eastern delegation. Unlike the U.S. delegation, the USSR delegation included a senior diplomat. Many criticized Eisenhower for not including a senior diplomat in the U.S. delegation.

  Their agenda was unclear. In his 2009 book Detecting the Bomb: The Role of Seismology in the Cold War, U.S. seismologist Carl Romney wrote, “Fedorov promptly raised an essentially political issue by proposing a statement of objectives that amounted to a prior commitment to a test ban.” Romney also stated, “Fisk countered that the Conference should confine its work to defining methods of detection, analyzing their capabilities and limitations, and le
t Governments decide how to use the information.”

  In advocating a treaty first with verification later, the Soviet Union stated that monitoring posts on its territory staffed by foreign citizens would be an excuse for espionage. The United States wanted strong verification measures such as monitoring stations in the USSR. The Soviet delegation received new instructions on many of the verification proposals enumerated by Fisk. Informal meetings on each of these topics were largely technical and constructive, whereas formal meetings of the entire delegations were more politically charged.

  A final report completed in August 1958 contained agreed-upon conclusions on verifiability, the establishment of a global network of 180 monitoring (control) stations, and the need for on-site inspections. Nevertheless, identifying underground explosions and distinguishing their signals from those of earthquakes were the most contentious issues, as they remained for many decades. I think that these issues, in fact, were resolved by 1970.

  Much data existed by 1958 on monitoring explosions in the atmosphere but not much on underground tests. Detection of acoustic waves from explosions in the oceans was known to be considerably easier than identification of underground nuclear explosions. In 1955 the United States detonated a 30-kiloton underwater device called Wigwam in the eastern Pacific. Sensors detected this and the Baker underwater test of 1946 at large distances. The Soviet Union conducted two underwater nuclear explosions of 6 and 10 kilotons near its Arctic islands of Novaya Zemlya. Romney stated that both underwater shots were well recorded by stations of the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS). Those results, the locations of stations, and the capabilities of AEDS at the time, however, were classified and remained so for decades. While Romney had access to them, most other scientists did not.

  The experts from the United States and the USSR agreed that earthquakes under the oceans, which account for about half of the world’s earthquakes, could be considered as identified if they did not produce large acoustic signals (sound waves) in the oceans. An explosion in the water column is much more efficient at generating those waves than an earthquake within the oceanic crust.